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Who Pays for Health Care Reform? 
Susan Giaimo 
THE extraordinary post-war boom came to an abrupt halt in the mid-
1970s. The sluggish economic growth that followed ushered in a critical re-
examination of the purposes and performance of the welfare state in all 
advanced industrialized societies. While social policy during the 'Golden Age' 
had aimed at expanding the scope and generosity of the welfare state and 
thereby redistributing the fruits of economic growth, by the 1980s and 1990s, 
'retrenchment' had become the watchword. For many policy makers, business 
leaders, and research institutes, the welfare state had become synonymous with 
high costs and deteriorating economic performance. In their view, welfare state 
reform was critical to successful national or industry adjustment to tougher 
economic conditions (Pfaller, Gough, and Therborn 1991 ; OECD 1994d). 
The 'new politics of the welfare state'• has also altered the relative posi-
tion of various welfare state stakeholders. The views of those who finance 
the welfare state have steadily gained influence in policy debates, while those 
who provide and receive social benefits have increasingly found themselves 
on the defensive. gmployers and government policy makers, and their inter-
est i£1 cost containment,_.have becqm~.~-dtiviug • .(QIQ.e behind welfare state 
reform. 
till, the project of containing welfare state outlays has been controver-
sial. Such projects not only threaten the prerogatives of entrenched con-
stituencies who benefit from social programmes (Pierson 1994), but also raise 
fundamental distributional concerns. Welfare states, after all , have sought 
to protect the vulnerable from the vagaries of the market (Polanyi 1944 
[1957]: ch. 14). The critical questions surrounding the new politics of the 
welfare state, then, are whether payers' and policy makers' cost-containment 
projects have succeeded, and if so, whether the price of success has been the 
sacrifice of equity and solidarity. Have the burdens of welfare state reform 
and economic adjustment disproportionately fallen upon the shoulders of 
the weakest members of society, or have countries found ways to share this 
pain in a just fashion? 
1 The phrase is taken from Pierson (1996). 
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This chapter explores these questions through the lens of health care reform 
in Britain, Germany, and the United States since the late 1 980s. Each coun-
try- has a distinctive health care system. And each country undertook major 
reform initiatives designed to control health care outlays. Thus, Britain's 
National H~alth Service (NHS) is the model of a universal, state-administered 
health care system financed by general revenues; Germany has a statutory 
national insurance programme financed by employers and employees; while 
· the USA relies primarily on voluntary, employment:.based, fringe benefits to 
cover the majority of the workforce. Public programmes play a· smaller role, 
covering only specified categories of the population. Looking at three dif-
ferent health care systems permits us to explore whether countries have 
converged on a common reform response in spite of their institutional vari-
ations, or whether institutional and political differences continued to shape 
reform paths in specific ways. 
As this chapter will show, the three countries addressed the effi.ciency 
and equity goals in markedly different ways. Britain and Germany thus far 
have achieved good cost performance without surrendering the principle 
of universal access and without requiring the most vulnerable members of 
society to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment. Indeed, 
Britain's record on cost containment has been the best of the three cases. 
While the price has been explicit rationing of access to hospital care, Britain 
has done so in ways that address equity. Germany represents an inter-
mediate case between Britain and the USA, spending more than the former 
but without resorting to the gaping inequities of the latter. The USA has 
only recently enjoyed markedly slower increases in health care outlays. But 
the cost-containment gains have come at the expense of worsening access 
to care for the sicker and poorer in society. 
The reasons for these very different outcomes lie in the actions and 
preferences of payers and the state in each country. Specifically, payers' 
capacities to follow cost-containment strategies that were inimical to equity 
and solidarity depended on the health care system in which they found 
themselves, the political system and whether it provided them an avenue to 
influence health policies, and their own organizational capacity to pursue 
a unified, coheren.t line of action. In addition, because state actors had dif-
ferent roles in health care governance, they had varying expectations and 
capacities to ensure that cost-containment projects were compatible with 
equity. In brief, the universal health care systems of Britain and Germany 
blocked cost-containment strategies by payers or government actors that would 
have sacrificed equity, while the private, voluntary fringe benefits system of 
the United States, encouraged employers and insurers to take cost-cutting 
actions that worked in the direction of desolidarity. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds along the following lines. Section 1 pro-
vides a broader background to situate the contemporary politics of health care 
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reform. It explains how and why health care systems in Western countries 
have come under the stress of increasing cost pressures even as governments 
·. and employers have become more apprehensive about the possible effects 
of the welfare state on economic competitiveness. Section 2 develops the 
argument in greater depth. It explains how existing health care and polit-
ical systems provide different opportunities or constraints for payers and 
the state to pursue unilateral cost-containment strategies, how health care 
institutions themselves shape policy preferences and strategies of payers, and 
how some systems require compromise solutions that reconcile equity with 
efficiency. Section 3 presents each country's case. The concluding section 
considers the broader lessons from health care reform for the contemporary 
politics of welfare state adjustment. 
1. TO SPEND MORE OR TO SPEND LESS? 
COMPETING PRESSURES ON HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEMS 
Payers' anxieties over rising health care costs are not unfounded. In general, 
health care has consumed a large and growing portion of social spending 
in all advanced industrialized societies, particularly in the past two decades. 
Beginning in the 1970s, health care systems experienced a 'cost explosion' 
that had the misfortune of coinciding with the global economic slowdown 
and concomitant worries about the fiscal viability of the welfare state. 
However, our three countries did not fare identical1y. Britain has con-
sistently been a low spender on the NHS when compared to its peers in the 
OECD. And having experienced a cost surge in the mid-1970s, Germany 
largely regained control over its health care outlays in the 1 980s. The USA 
has had the greatest appetite for health care and remains at the top of the 
world league in health care spending (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2). The spend-
ing disparities are even more remarkable when one considers that both 
Britain and Germany have been able to extend access to care to the entire 
population while the USA has not. 
Some of the reasons for escalating health care costs are, to varying degrees, 
common to all Western countries. First, the health sector is fertile ground for 
technological innovations that may prolong life but at considerable expense. 
In addition, once these discoveries are made, it is difficult- though not 
impossible- for insurers or governments to limit their diffusion, as patients 
demand access to such treatments (see Weisbrod 1985). Second, the popula-
tions of Western countries are graying, with direct consequences for health 
care. Older persons are likely to experience acute illnesses requiring high-tech 
interventions, or, more often, chronic conditions entailing long-term care. 
Both types of care do not come cheaply. At the same time, birth rates have 
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TABLE ll.l. Health care spending as a percentage ofGDP, 1960- 97 -
Year Britain Germany United Sta~es 
1960 3.9 4 .8 5.2 
1965 4.1 4.6 5.9 
1970 4.5 6.3 7.3 
1975 5.5 8.8 8.2 
1980 5.6 8.8 9. 1 
. 1985 5.9 9.3 10.6 
1990 6.0 8.7 12.6 
1991 6.5 9.4 13.4 
1992 6.9 9.9 13.9 
19.93 6.9 10.0 14.1 
1994 6.9 10.0 14.1 
1995 6.9 10.4 14.1 
1996 6.9 10.5 14.0 
1997 6.7 10.4 14.0 
Source: OECD. Health Data (1998). 
TABLE 11.2. Health care spending per capita, 1960-97 ($/exchange rate) 
Year Britain Germany United States 
1960 54 48 149 
1965 76 78 212 
1970 99 149 357 
1975 229 467 605 
1980 537 9 13 1,086 
1985 472 743 1,798 
1990 1,024 1,650 2,799 
1991 I, 129 2,018 3,035 
1992 1,252 2,433 3,276 
1993 I , 112 2,350 3,468 
1994 1,213 2,533 3,628 
1995 1,313 3,080 3,767 
1996 1,358 3,017 3,898 
1997 1,457 2,677 4,090 
Source: OECD , Health Data (1998). 
failed to keep pace with increasing longevity, so that there will be fewer 
working-age persons in the future to shoulder the financial obligations 
associated with caring for their elders. Third, the health sector is a huge 
generator of service sector employment. But jobs in this sector tend to be 
labour-intensive and have lower productivity than the manufacturing jobs 
they are replacing. If Iversen and Wren ( 1998) are correct, the smaller growth 
rates associated with the shift to a post-industrial economy will only make 
the question of adequate financing of health care that much worse. 
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Some of the causes for health care inflation, however, rest with the specific 
design of health care systems in individual countries. Fee-for-service arrange-
ments for paying health care providers tend to be more inflationary than 
salary or capitation. The lack of a national budgeting mechanism to contain 
overall health care outlays is likely to produce cost-shifting rather than effect-
ive cost containment. Health care ·systems with multiple insurers tend to have 
higher administrative. costs than single-payer systems. Some countries lack 
effective mechanisms to control the supply of specialists and hospitals and 
patients' access to them. Each of our countries has addressed (or failed to 
address) these issues in different ways. Section 3 addresses the particular 
problems they faced and their specific methods for dealing with them. 
Regardless of their relative success or failure in ensuring cost discipline, 
governments or employers in the three countries believed that health care 
outlays posed immediate and long-term problems, and began to search for 
ways to address them. The reasons for such concerns are twofold. First, the 
developments exerting pressure to spend more on health care services have 
come at a time when economic growth has slowed from its historic post-war 
levels. This has raised concerns over how to finance current and future com-
mitments in social spending, that is, whether mature welfare states can and 
will remain affordable. But the second concern has to do with the welfare state's 
impact on broader economic performance. While the exact date differed in 
each of our countries, from the 1980s and into the 1990s, the welfare state 
became inseparable from the question of national and firm-level adjustments 
to a more integrated and competitive world economy. In these debates, the 
welfare state was painted as a drag on or impediment to economic adjustment, 
and the solution seemed to be retrenchment measures of various sorts.2 
Whether or how the welfare state has actually hurt economic perform-
ance may be open to question, but the change in the terms of political debate 
cannot be denied. The welfare state's impact on economic performance has 
become one of the most discussed topics among policy makers and academics, 
and has even spilled over into broader public discussions in Western 
2 However, different kinds of health care systems and welfare states appear to have dif-
ferent vulnerabilities in a more competitive and integrated economic environment. Where social 
provision is tied to employment, then the cost of fringe benefits or social insurance contribu-
tions has a direct impact on labour costs. Many analysts and employers recognize that high 
non-wage labour costs ·have adverse effects on employment, especially at the low end of the 
labour market (Scharpf 1997b). In voluntary fringe benefits systems, the problem of free-riding 
is rampant, and may place firms that provide benefits at a competitive disadvantage. Welfa re 
states financed from general revenues can avoid saddling firms with higher labour costs. 
But they may present their own particular difficulties. Governments may have to raise taxes 
to levels that voters find intolerable, or choose to run expensive deficits and debts to cover 
spending commitments (see Genschel 1999; Pierson, Ch. 3 in this volume). If they opt for 
deficits, then governments run the risk of punishment by international financial markets, or 
exclusion from membership in regional economic clubs like Europe's single currency. 
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countries. Concomitantly, payers' concerns over cost containment -have car-
ried greater weight in social policy debates than in previous decades. 
2. THE ARGUMENT: PAYERS AND THE POLITICS 
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 
By the end of the 1980s, the terms of debate, the goals, and the relative power 
of different actors had shifted. Cost containment had become a priority 
of health policy, and the question of economic competitiveness cast a long 
shadow over the calculations of policy makers and employers alike. Still, in 
some countries, the politics of health care reform required employers and 
state actors to forge negotiated settlements that accepted some cost control 
pain in exchange for equity gains (see also Bonoli, in this volume; Rhodes, 
in this volume). In other countries, however, such exchanges were absent, 
and the pursuit of cost control came at the expense of equity. 
To explain these different outcomes, we must know who the payers were, 
what they wanted from health care reform, and what they were able to achieve 
in that regard. Whether payers were employers or the state, their policy pref-
erences depended on whether they viewed the existing health care system as 
a help or a hindrance to their broader strategies of economic competit-
iveness. Furthermore, each country's health care system either granted 
or denied employers, insurers, or the state opportunities to take unilateral 
action to contain their own health care outlays at the expense of other stake-
holders. In addition, the political arena provided different avenues for pay-
ers and other stakeholders to influence the course of health policy. Formal 
political institutions, contingent electoral outcomes, and the organizational 
characteristics of interest groups representing critical stakeholders worked 
to produce a particular brand of health care politics in each country. 
The most critical variable, however, was whether the health care system was 
a universal, statutory system or not. If a country's health care system legally 
guaranteed a universal right to health services, then it placed serious con-
straints on unilate·ral cost-cutting strategies by either the state or employers. 
Such systems created broad constituencies or other countervailing actors 
to check employers' or governments' efforts at one-sided cost-shifting. The 
critical role of employees or taxpayers in financing or administering health 
care programmes granted them as much legitimacy as policy makers or 
employers in health care reform debates, while the political system provided 
them additional means of influence over the content of reform policies. In 
addition, because universal health care systems institutionalized equity and 
redistribution in their core design (see Stone 1993: 292), they made efforts 
to shift the burden of cost containment on to those least able to shoulder 
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it politically difficult; such attempts were viewed as morally unjust. But while 
universal systems placed a heavy obligation on state actors to guarantee their 
solida.rity, they also granted the latter the means to govern the behaviour 
of health care actors to ensure their compliance with both efficiency and 
equity. Voluntary fringe benefits systems, by contrast, contained none of 
these mechanisms or countervailing actors to constrain the behaviour of 
employers or insurers. If anything, it was government actors who found their 
freedom of manoeuvre and their authority over private actors in the health 
care system severely circumscribed. The three countries help elaborate the 
different parts of the argument. 
First, each country's health care system designated different actors as 
payers and provided them with different capacities to realize their cost-
containment goals. Thus, in Britain's National Health Service (NHS), the 
state is responsible for financing and providing health care. Its status as 
a single payer would seemingly grant the state unlimited freedom to decide 
health policy. But in fact there are limits: the state must answer to taxpayers 
who ultimately finance the health care budget. In Germany, employers and 
employees have equal responsibility for financing and administering national 
health insurance. Because both employers and unions are firmly embedded 
in these arrangements, it is difficult for one side to take unilateral action 
against the other. In addition, the statutory nature of health insurance closes 
off the option of 'exit' by employers, since they must provide insurance 
to their workers. In the USA, employers have been the pivotal players and 
payers in the politics of health care reform because most Americans obtain 
health insurance as a company-based fringe benefit. At the same time, 
employers are free to provide or withhold fringe benefits, since these are 
voluntary. And since employees and unions lack an institutionalized role 
in health insurance financing or administration, they have not been able to 
mount an effective opposition to employers' cost-cutting strategies. Lastly, 
many employers have viewed government efforts to intervene in the private 
fringe benefits system as an illegitimate intrusion in corporate governance. 
- econd, in addition to the health care system, the political arena has 
offered payers an alternative or complementary channel of influence over 
the course of health care reform. In Britain, taxpayers have two means of 
influence. One is the ballot box, which, admittedly, is a blunt instrument 
wielded infrequeJ)tly. But the other is through members of parliament 
who regularly grill the government on the performance of the NHS. These 
accountability mechanisms partially offset the tendency towards a politics 
of imposition that the centralized political system encourages. In Germany, 
both employers and employees have found the various political parties 
to be willing advocates for their views. Coalition governments and parties 
associated with specific health care clients have made compromise and the 
balancing of the countervailing interests of employers and employees the 
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norm in health politics. Federalism, too, has sometimes provided health 
care actors with an additional means of influence. In the USA, the fragmented 
political system-especially separation of powers- bas provided employers 
ample o ppo rtunities or 'veto points' (lmmergut 1992; Steinmo and Watts 
1995) to influence the course of health care legislation. But while they may 
be good a t wielding the veto, employers have been hampered in their ability 
to take positive, unified actio n by their organizationa l fragmentation in the 
political arena. In fact, the business 'community' is a misnomer that masks 
the reality of competing peak associations with few if any sanctions over 
wayward members. As D avid Vogel (1978) has pointed out, most business 
leaders tend to think of policy questions in t~rms of the interests of their 
own firm rather than o f the business community as a who le. The weakness 
of American business as a co llective actor in the political a rena mirrors the 
autonomy of individual enterprises and the multiple cost-cutting options 
available to them in a private, voluntary fringe benefits system. 
Third, statutory, universal programmes make the pursuit of cost con-
tainment at the expense of equity difficult, while voluntary fringe benefits 
systems do not. One reason for this is that universal systems create broad 
constituencies with a stake in preserving the quality and comprehensive-
ness of benefits. To put it bluntly, middle-class beneficiaries find themselves 
in the same risk community as the poor, but their reasons for fighting to 
protect these programmes from retrenchment may arise from simple self-
interest rather than out of any sense of justice or a ltruism towards the less 
fortunate. Add to this the reality that the middle and upper classes tend to 
be more active in poli tics than the poor (though this is truer in the USA 
than in other countries), then the risk of electoral retributio n for major 
retrenchment is high. Moreover, universal programmes carry legitimacy in 
the public eye because the majority of beneficiaries make some sort of con-
tribution to them, either through payroll deductions to social insurance or 
through general revenues to finance a national health service. Benefits take 
on the status of entitlement based on contributions. Indeed , in some coun-
tries, courts have ruled th at benefits are akin to property rights to be safe-
guarded by law (~ee Myles and Pierson, in this volume). Thus; the political 
risks a re high for governments that launch retrenchment policies tha t 
appear to threaten the entitlements of a formidable range of stakeholders. 
However, universal health care programmes go well beyond an appeal 
to self-interest or enti tlement based on past contributions. ln fact, they are 
the most redistributive of social insurance programmes, creating broad 
solidarities that encompass equity and that protect the more disadvantaged 
members of society. Unlike pensions and unemployment insurance pro-
grammes, in which benefits are calculated on the basis of past contributions 
and earnings, the universal health care programmes in Britain and Germany 
incorporate substan tia l redistribution through the pooling of risks. They 
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involve cross-subsidies from richer to poorer, younger to older, healthier to 
sicker, men to women (Hinrichs 1995; Stone 1993: esp. 290- 2). And despite 
differences in their institutional arrangements, the health care systems in both 
countries approach Marshall's (1963) ideal of social citizenship, whereby each 
person has a right to a decent social minimum as a necessary precondition 
for full participation and membership in the larger community. 3 In both Britain 
and Germany, definitions of social citizenship and a decent social minimum 
have been generously drawn to mean that every person has a right to the same 
level of high-quality care, based on one's medical need, not on one's ability 
to pay or past contributions. By contrast, two-tiered systems of provision 
based on ability to pay, which grant generous services for the wealthy and only 
residual benefits for the poor, violate the universality and comprehensiveness 
of social citizenship and their associated notions of equity. 
In short, the universal health care systems of Britain and G ermany 
equate equity with equality. Equity is defined as a broad solidarity, in which 
the p oor and sick have the same status as the wealthy and healthy. This 
equation derives from the ideas of mutuality and reciprocity that underpin 
social insurance: people identify with each other in recognizing that they 
aJl share a risk of becoming ill or incapacitated , and respond by pooling 
their risks against this vulnerability (Baldwin 1990; Stone 1993). In doing 
so, universal programmes incorporate equity by extending their reach to 
include the disadvantaged with the better off and tying them together in a 
common fate: Put another way, these programmes achieve the goal of equity 
by ' targeting within universalism' (Skocpol 1991).4 The institutionalization 
3 Baldwin ( 1990) points out that universalistic, tax-financed programmes are more solid-
aristic because they consider the nation as the risk pool, while social insurance programmes 
segment risk pools a long class, occupational, or regional lines. However, even in Germany's 
national insurance programme, the broader conception of solidarity has taken root. In the 
past two decades, the state has mandated that the sickness funds offer approximately 
simila r benefits (on the basis that all are entitled to medically necessary care). And the 1993 
reforms introduced a financial risk-pooling scheme among blue-collar and white-collar funds 
(see below and also Giaimo and Manow 1999). 
4 The debate between universal and targeted programmes as a more effective and efficient 
way to address the problems of the disadvantaged is not new. Skocpol echoes past advocates 
of universal programmes by arguing that such arrangements better address the needs of the 
poor because they have broader political support and higher levels of funding that residual 
programmes lack. Thus, she calls for universal rather than targeted programmes as the best 
way to meet the needs of the disadvantaged. Titmuss saw the dilemma between targeted and 
universal programmes as a key challenge of modern welfare states. However, he supported 
selective benefits targeted to needy groups in addition to universal programmes. In his eyes, 
a broader framework of universalism and a language of social rights were prerequisites to 
for ta rgeted programmes to escape stigma. A universal framework was needed because 
it 'provides a general system of values and a sense of community; ... sees welfare, not as a 
burden, but as complementary and as an instrument of change and, ... allows positive d is-
criminatory services to be provided as rights for categories of people and for classes of need 
in terms of priority social areas and other impersonal classifications' (Titrouss 1987 b: 154). 
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of risk-sharing behaviour through social insurance thereby reinforces values 
.of sharing and community among the population. Universal programmes 
thus rest on multiple bases of legitimacy that are broadly shared- from 
a notion of justice grounded on one's full inclusion in the community of · 
social citizenship, through ideas of reciprocity and mutualism, to simple 
self-interest in preserving one's own entitlements- that together prove quite 
resistant to challenges of retrenchment. 5 
With social insurance, then, self-interest is compatible wi.th reciprocity 
and pooling of risks. But self-interest can just as easily be conceived of in 
narrower terms, as 'one gets what one pays for'. This expresses the logic 
of actuarial fairness practised by private insurers. Actuarial fairness main-
tains that those who are healthier have no obligation to cross-subsidize 
those who are sick. Rather, insurance premiums should only reflect one's 
expected or actual use of health care. In practice, this kind of 'justice' 
encourages aJI sorts of inequities. Private commercial insurers, following the 
dictates of profit maximization and actuarial fairness, segment the market, 
'cream skim' the healthier and wealthier patients, since they are the least 
costly to insure, and shun the unprofitable, expensive cases, namely, the sicker 
and poorer (Stone 1993). In sum, and in contrast to Britain and Germany, 
the private and voluntary nature of employee fringe benefits in the USA pro-
duces rampant inequities. Both employers and insurers are free to 'opt out' 
and refuse to cover the poorer and sicker on the grounds of competitiveness 
or profit. 
Finally, statutory universal programmes and private fringe benefits systems 
affect state actors' freedom of manoeuvre as much as that of employers. 
In universal systems, the state has the legal obligation to guarantee that 
all citizens have access to comprehensive health care. This obligation holds 
not only in a nationalized health service like Britain's, where the state is the 
payer, but also in a social insurance system like Germany's, where the state 
is not. Such obligations have set political limits to how far governments could 
push retrenchment and whether they could do so in ways that burdened the 
most vulnerable. But at the same time, the statutory systems of Britain and 
Germany have provided governments with the legal authority and institu-
tional means to set the parameters of the system and ensure that health 
care actors' quest for cost control did not destroy equity and solidarity. The 
government in London could use the hierarchical administrative apparatus 
s Social insuranc~ programmes might also incorporate (or least be compatible with) other 
motives or norms besides self-interest or mutual obligations and rights. Such programmes 
might also reflect a belief that in a civilized society, the stronger members have a responsibil-
ity to help the weaker, which would be expressions of paternalism or altr uism. Nevertheless, 
Baldwin ( 1990) rightly points out that social insurance rooted in reciprocity removes the stigma 
and dependence of charity and instead accords benefits based on social rights or equal status 
in the risk community. 
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in the NHS to shape the pace and content of its reform programme in imple-
mentation, while the federal government in Germany could mandate new 
implementation tasks and rules on public-law bodies of insurers, providers, 
employers, and employees. But in the private employer-based health insur-
ance system of the United States, government actors were denied the legal 
authority and the institutional linkages to prevent employers and insurers 
from following a range of go-it-alone cost-containment strategies that have 
burdened the weaker members of society. Businesses and insurers have 
viewed government efforts to regulate the health care system as an illegit-
imate intrusion in their private domain, while the peculiarities of regulatory 
federalism have militated against coherent government action in this area. 
The experiences of health care reform in Britain, Germany, and the 
United States presented below bear out these conclusions. 
3. THE CASES 
Britain: The Limits of Neoliberal Reform in a Universal 
Health Care System 
In Britain's NHS, the state plays a predominant role in financing and 
providing health care. Health care is financed from general revenues and 
the central government determines the NHS budget. The state owns the 
hospitals and governs the health service through successive tiers of heath 
authorities emanating from the Department of Health (DOH) at the 
centre. At the same time, state managers have shared authority in health 
care governance with the medical profession, granting the British Medical 
Association (BMA) an important role in policy making and administra-
tion (Giaimo 1994, 1995). British governments have also relied on hospital 
doctors to ration scarce resources through waiting lists for non-emergency 
hospital services. This amounted to an 'implicit concordat' with the medical 
profession, whereby doctors took on the unpleasant task of rationing and 
agreed to refrain from questioning governments' budgetary decisions; in 
exchange, policy makers did not question their clinical freedom (Day and 
Klein 1992: 471; Klein 1989: 235). 
Britain's health care reform debates in the 1980s and 1990s were not couched 
in terms of high labour costs because the NHS was financed from general 
revenues rather than payroll taxes. And Britain had a very respectable record 
of cost containment. Its fiscal discipline· owed to global budgeting of health 
care and limiting the-number of hospital beds and specialist physicians. The 
NHS also relied on general practitioners to act as gatekeepers to hospital 
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and specialist care, and rationed elective surgical and hospital procedures by 
. means of waiting lists based on medical need.6 
Still, the costs and effects of the welfare state on Britain's economic health 
remained an issue for Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher's disdain for the health 
service reflected her neoliberal distrust of 'big government' and collectivist 
politics generally, both of which she saw as responsible for Britain's economic 
decline.7 And containing health care outlays was part of her broader agenda 
· to bring public spending under control (Harrison 1988: ch. 5) and unleash 
private economic initiative to bring about Britain's economic regeneration. 
Thatcher thus subjected the NHS to a severe austerity regimen through-
out the 1980s.8 But as Klein (1995) observed, the Prime Minister's success 
in holding down health care spending exacted a high political cost, provok-
ing a bitter public quarrel with Parliament, health policy experts, and the 
medical profession. As waiting lists grew and hospitals closed wards and 
cancelled operations, cri tics charged that the government's 'underfunding' 
policy was starving the health service of needed funds, charges which only 
fuelled public fears that the NHS was not 'safe in the Conservatives' hands'.9 
Thatcher countered that inefficiencies in delivering health care, rooted in 
unaccountable doctors and managers eager to defer to them, were respons-
ible for the burgeoning waiting lists. But with public criticism mounting, she 
initiated a full-scale review of the NHS in 1988. 
The political system and the policy making process offered her the 
luxury to consider a range of radical proposals and to enact her reforms 
with relative ease. First, the review was a secretive a ffair involving Thatcher, 
a few trusted advisers, and outsiders whose political views mirrored her own. 
It was a break from the royal commissions of her predecessors, which had 
included all relevant interests. Second, party discipline and a huge parlia-
mentary majority reassured Thatcher that her legislation would be enacted 
by Parliament. 
But even with these political advantages, Thatcher discovered that there 
were limits to her reform ambitions, at least on the question of radically 
6 However, Aaron and Schwartz ( 1984) found that some proced ures were rationed on social 
grounds rather than strictly clinica l criteria. 
7 For the neoliberal critique of Britain's decline and accounts of the rise of the New Right 
in Britain, see Gamble 1994: ch. 2; Jenkins 1987; and D. Kavanagh 1990: esp. chs. 3 and 4. 
According to neoliberals, 'big government' and 'special interests· stifled individual initiative 
and economic growth. ln Thatcher's eyes, the NHS epitomized these twin evils: it was a sprawl-
ing public bureaucracy full of rigidities, dominated by a medical profession unacco untable 
to elected officials, managers, and consumers. 
8 N HS spending increased 3% per year in the 1980s. But this rate was much lower than 
in previous decades and below what health care experts considered sufficient to keep up with 
technological advances, population ageing, and medical need (Ham, Robinson, and Benzeval 
1990: 12- 14; Klein 1995: 142). 
9 For an account of the health care debates in the 1980s, see Klein 1995 and Giaimo 1994. 
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transforming the financing arrangements for health care. The review team 
considered but rejected radical proposals for compulsory national insurance 
or mandatory private insurance on the grounds that the economic and polit-
ical costs would have been prohibitive: both of these options would have 
done far worse in controlling health care costs than the centralized budgets 
and administrative simplicity of the single-payer NHS. And for all its short-
comings, the NHS was the most popular element of the British welfare state. 
Thatcher gauged that dismantling it would have only invited the retribution 
of voters (Timmins 1995: 392- 4; 453-65). 10 In addition, national insurance 
would have shifted the cost of health care onto employers and almost 
certainly provoked their opposition. And it would have undercut her strat-
egy to attract inward investment and aid industry competitiveness through 
low labour costs. 
With privatization off the table, Thatcher decided that she would instead 
bring the market into the NHS itself. Hence, the 1989 White Paper called 
for an ' internal market' in the NHS, which split purchasers from providers. 
NHS hospitals were granted independence from district health authorities 
(DHAs). But hospitals now had to compete with each other and with the 
private sector for the patients of DHA purchasers or those of general prac-
titioner fundholders. Fundholders were large, office-based, primary care 
physician practices that accepted a budget to purchase certain diagnostic 
and elective hospital procedures for their patients for which long waiting lists 
existed. In addition to the market reforms, the government also granted NHS 
managers a range of monitoring controls over doctors, from job descrip-
tions to mandatory physician peer review, to ensure that doctors provided 
more cost-effective care (UK Department of Health 1989). The government 
hoped that competition would not only yield more efficient health care 
delivery but would also devolve responsibility for NHS performance fai lures 
down to local purchasers and providers. 
In practice, however, the central state exerted tight control over the 
internal market. Thatcher's successor, John Major, streamlined the admin-
istrative tiers in the NHS, thereby increasing the capacity of ministers 
and managers at the centre to intervene in the day-to-day administrative 
10 A proposal for private health insurance that the Prime Minister's policy unit floated in 
1982 met with fierce media criticism and public outcry, prompting Thatcher to disavow it 
(see Timmins 1995). · 
Thatcher's health care reforms thus differed from her policy towards state earnings-related 
pensions, which she gradually phased out (see Myles and Pierson, in this volume). But her 
caution in health policy was not only because the NHS was less expensive than other alter-
natives. Rather, the political risks of switching to a new health care system were considerable. 
The contrast with SERPS pensions is instructive. Unlike the NHS, which was more than 
40 years old and upon which most Britons relied for health care, SERPS was an immature 
programme with relatively few pensioners dependent on it. Thus, the political and financial 
costs o f phasing out SERPS were smaller in comparison to the NHS. 
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decisions of local units. And both he and Thatcher designed the market so 
as to limit the scope of competition among providers in order to ensure that 
they would not shy away from treating sicker, more expensive patients. 11 
In some cases, this meant pre-empting market forces altogether, as with 
Major's decision to pursue a centrally directed rationalization policy for 
London hospitals rather than allow disruptive market forces to decide the 
winners and losers (see James 1995). For their part, health service purchasers 
and providers preferred co-operative, longer term contractual relationships 
than the one-off encounters characteristic of a spot market that the Thatcher 
Government had envisioned (Light 1997). 
. How can one explain the continued presence of the state in the market, 
and the very limited competition that was permitted? While the formidable 
technical difficulties of creating a market from scratch required detailed 
guidance and intervention from the NHS Executive, political considerations 
proved a more powerful brake on the market. First, the universalism of the 
NHS created a broad constituency with a stake in assuring access to quality 
care. Any cost-cutting programme that threatened a steep and visible decline 
in quality risked punishment at the polls from middle-class (and working-
class) voters. Second, the universal citizenship rights in the NHS created 
a broad solidarity and commitment to equity that the pubHc expected the 
government to guarantee. More than any other branch of the British welfare 
state, the NHS has epitomized-or has at least aspired to-a comprehensive 
notion of community based on Marshall's (1 963) idea of social citizenship, 
and has expressed this soHdarity as the right of all to a comprehensive 
level of care, (nearly) free of charge, on the basis of clinical need rather than 
on ability to pay (Klein 1995: ch. l; Ministry of Health, no date; Speller 1948; 
Titmuss 1974, 1987a, b)Y The deep attachment to the solidarity of the 
NHS not only ran strong within the Labour Party (which, after all, had 
created the health service), but also among the Tory wing of the Conserva-
tive Party that was sympathetic to state intervention in the economy and 
in social welfare. All of these political considerations compelled the Conser-
vatives to carefully craft and constrain the workings of the internal market 
to avert the mos~ egregious inequities and chaos that unbrid led competition 
would have unleashed. 
11 Thus, the government limited GP fundholders' financial liability and the range of hospitaJ 
services they could purchase, restricted the freedom of hospitals and fundholders to dispense 
with their ' profits'. and mandated the development of a capitation system for purchasers that 
wouJd adjust for inequities based on patients' health status (Maynard 1991; U K Department 
of Health 1989). 
12 Indeed, o pinion polls have consistently shown that the public remains strongly committed 
to the principles of tax-financed. universalistic, and publicly provided health care and willing 
to pay higher taxes for health care (Klein 1995: J 35- 6. 240; Taylor-Gooby 199 1: ch. 5). 
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· Finally, the centralized structures of both the NHS and the political sys-
tem made it hard for the government to ' let go' once the market was in place. 
Because the central government provided health care and determined the 
budget of the NHS, it had a direct stake in how that money was spent. 
Government ministers had to deal with the Treasury's perennial concerns 
over 'value for money', and Parliament's concern for the level of quality 
of services. Ministers had to face the regular grilling of members of Parlia-
ment (MPs) during parbamentary question time, and were held accountable 
for the performance failures even in the far-flung reaches of the NHS. 
Government ministers deemed it intolerable to cede control to lower level 
managers or to freewheeling market forces, while still being held responsible 
by voters and MPs. 
And even as the NHS placed a heavy obligation on politicians to safe-
guard the equity of health care provision as they pursued cost contain-
ment, it also granted them the means to do so. The statutory guarantee of 
universal access gave government officials the authority to set rules on the 
behaviour of purchasers and providers in the health care market to ensure 
that their competitive behaviour did not come at the expense of the sickest 
and most costly patients. At the same time, the hierarchical tiers of health 
authorities served as the conduit through which the central government con-
trolled the introduction and subsequent development of market forces in 
the NHS. 
How well , ·then, did Conservative governments uphold their role as 
guarantor of equitable access for all while pursuing cost containment? On 
the question of equity, the record is mixed. On the one hand, the internal 
market reforms did not produce enough efficiency gains to make waiting 
lists noticeably diminish, much less disappear. In and of themselves, waiting 
lists do not offend equity, since one's place in the line is based on medical 
need. But since the inception of the NHS, those with private insurance 
have been able to jump ahead of the waiting lists for elective surgery. This 
inequality of access between those with private and public coverage has long 
been a point of contention in health politics, and only grudgingly tolerated 
by Labour politicians. Still, the extent of this inequity is often exaggerated. 
The segment of the population with private insurance has always been a small 
minority; in 1990, only 11 per cent of the population had private coverage 
(Klein 1995: 155; Timmins 1995: 507). Moreover, private coverage has 
served more as a 'safety valve' for unmet need, rather than providing the 
middle class a path of permanent exit from the public system. Those with 
private insurance still receive most of their care from the NHS as public 
patients, because private policies are restrictive in their scope of coverage, 
and tend to be confined to profitable elective procedures and amenities like 
private hospital room and choice of specialist (Klein 1995: 155- 7; Timmins 
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1995: 507)Y This means that the bulk of the population accepts (even if 
unenthusiastically) rationing of non-emergency hospital treatment th rough 
waiting lists whose criterion is medical need. The question for British 
policy makers is whether limiting access to non-emergency treatments still 
imposes suffering and reduced quality of life for those on the lists. 
A greater criticism is that the internal market's fundholding scheme 
introduced a new kind of inequity of access among NHS patients them-
selves. Now, the wait for elective surgery was no longer solely a question 
of medical need but also of the ability of one's purchaser to pay. While the 
evidence was by no means definitive, it suggested that larger fundholding 
practices used their budgets and business savvy to achieve faster services 
for their patients than did non-fundholding practices. 14 
On balance, however, the NHS has weathered the changes of the internal 
market to retain much of its egalitarianism and universalism, and the Con-
servative reforms represented a quite limited challenge to solidarity. Universal 
access to medically necessary care remains a statutorily guaranteed, social 
right of ci tizenshjp. And as noted above, policy makers have taken great care 
to limit the play of market forces in the NHS to avoid flagrant inequities. 
Thus, fundholders and providers in the internal market operate under a num-
ber of constraints that discourage or prevent them from skimming the best 
patients. Moreover, the Blair Government's intention to abolish fundholding 
would presumably eliminate the threat that the scheme posed to equity. 15 
13 Private insurance covered 6.4% of the population in 1980, rising to 11.5% in 1989. Twenty-
three per cent of employers and managers had private insurance at the end of the 1980s, while 
27% of professionals did (Klein 1995: 155). Private insurance was also a company fringe benefit 
highly dependent on the health of the economy; in the recession of the early 1990s, private 
insurance coverage stagnated. Among those with private insurance, more than half of their 
in-patient stays and 80% of their out-patient stays were covered as N HS patients (Timmins 
1995: 507). Finally, while the number of private hospitals and providers increased, and the 
proportion of spending on institutional care rose from less than 10% in 1986 to 19% in 1993, 
most of this growth was in the area of nursing home care, which the N HS did not cover any-
way (K lein 1995: 158- 60; Timmins 1995: 507). 
Waiting lists rose from 700,000 in 1992 to nearly 1.3 million by 1998 ('Bevan's Baby Hits 
Middle Age', The Economist, 4 July 1998, 56). . 
14 Different contracts used by health authorities and fundholders accounted for some 
of the differences in access to hospital care (British M edical Journal, 12 Dec. 1992, 1451; 
23 Jan . 1993, 227- 9; Whitehead 1993). But some observers countered that fundholding had 
'spillover' effects that benefited all patients, and pointed to health authorities that consulted 
non-fund holding G Ps in their purchasing decisions or that devolved purchasing decisions to 
them (Klein 1995: 2~1-2). 
15 Fundholders will be replaced by larger primary care groups involving all G Ps, who will 
purchase an array of services on behalf of DHAs for a population area of up to I 00,000 patients. 
The Blair Government's proposals also indicate that it will continue with the centralizing 
tendencies of the Thatcher- Major reforms. The N HS Executive will have greater capacity 
to monitor doctors' practice patterns and intervene in the local decisions of managers and 
practitioners if deemed necessary (see Klein 1998; UK Department of Health 1997). 
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But did the market deliver the hoped-for cost discipline? The NHS has 
maintained its impressive record on containing costs relative to other OECD 
countries, but this is less a result of market competition than the effective-
ness of other policy instruments. In areas with multiple providers, the NHS 
has become more responsive to patients or their fundholder agents. And 
as a whole, more patients have been treated (Klein 1995). But the internal 
market has been expensive to create and administer: it has generated sub-
stantial transaction costs in terms of administrative personnel, and required 
generous financial inducements for GPs to take up fund holding. In any case, 
such generosity proved fleeting, as the Major Government subsequently 
resorted to a policy of austerity. 16 Thus, the remarkable cost discipline of the 
NHS has been less an achievement of market efficiencies than of policy 
makers' willingness to deploy the weapon of tight global budgets and the 
public's tolerance of waiting lists in a government-created context of scarcity. 
Germany: A 'Socially Bounded Market' within Corporatism 17 
Germany's compulsory national insurance system covers 90 per cent of the 
population through a network of approximately 500 quasi-public sickness 
funds (Krankenkassen) organized on class, occupational, and regional lines 
(Giamo and Monow 1999: 982). Despite their organizational differentiation, 
the sickness funds provide similar benefits packages as mandated by law. 
Employers and employees finance health insurance contributions in equal shares 
and have a role in health care administration through parity representation 
on the sickness funds ' boards. 18 In granting employers and employees equal 
roles in financing and administration, the German health insurance system 
has institutionalized the idea of countervailing power in its very design. 
Although the state does not finance health care, corporatist governance 
accords it a critical role in regulating the behaviour of sectoral actors and 
16 The number of managers soared from 700 in 1987 to over 13,000 in 199 1. Between 1991 
and 1992, there was an a lmost 25% increase in managerial personnel while only a I 'Yo rise in 
hospital medical staff (Pike, 'NHS Managers' Wage Bill Soars', Financial Times, 5-6 Sept. 
1992, 4; Pike, 'Rise of 25% in N HS Ma nagers'. Financial Times, II Dec. 1993, 6). The Blair 
Government calculated that managerial costs had risen from 9% to 12% (Klein 1998). G P 
fund holders initially received financial sweeteners to encourage their take-up in the scheme, 
though such payments were later discontinued (Sherman, ' 16,000 Pounds for Budget-
Holding G Ps', The Times, 14 Dec. 1989, 22). Critics charged that the amounts devoted to 
management merely siphoned ofT resources from direct patient care. Following its early gen-
erosity, the Major Government subsequently kept NHS spending increases well below the 
rate of inflation. Thus, NHS spending was projected to rise a mere 0.3% from 1996 to 1999 
('An Unhealthy Silence', The Economist, IS Mar. 1997, 57). 
17 The title is borrowed from Henke ( 1997). 
18 The boards of the sickness funds set the level of contribution rates, though in practice 
that power is circumscribed by law: the sickness funds cannot run long-term defici ts, so their 
cont ribution rates must cover their health care expenditures. 
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setting out the overall objectives for the·system. Through the instrument of 
framework legislation, the government sets out broad policy goals and rules 
for the health care system but then delegates the job of implementation to 
quasi-public associations. of sickness funds and physicians (Kasseniirztliche 
Vereinigungen, or KVs) at the provincial level. Guided by the principles of · 
subsidiarity and self-governance by sectoral actors, the state does not usu-
ally intervene directly in health care administration. But if sectoral actors 
refuse to implement the terms of the law, then the s~te may exercise its reserve 
powers of intervention until doctors and insurers prove able and willing to 
fulfil their public obligations. Once they do, the state pulls back and allows 
them to reclaim their collective rights of self-governance (Giaimo 1994, 1995; 
Gjaimo and Manow 1999; Streeck and Schmitter 1985). 
As part of its authority to set the parameters of the health care system, 
the state mandates that all employers offer insurance to their workers with 
incomes below a certain ceiling, finance contributions in equal shares with 
employees, and share with them in the administration of the sickness funds. 
In addition, the state also devises cost-containment policies that health care 
system actors are required to follow. For example, hospital doctors are salaried, 
while office-based practitioners must live within the confines of a regional 
or state-level budget cap for their services as negotiated by provincial-level 
associations of physicians and insurers. 19 In addition, providers and insurers 
are legaJly required to align their collective bargaining agreements with the 
principle of stable contribution rates (Beitragssatzstabilitiit). However, as we 
shall see, the state sometimes has difficulty getting doctors and payers to 
follow these provisions in their collective agreements. 
Because health insurance is employment-based, rising health care costs have 
always had a direct effect on labour costs. But Germany's bleaker economic 
conditions in the past decade have placed serious strain on a welfare state 
financed from payroll contributions. The worldwide recession of the early 
1990s, along with the costs of German unification, drove up the demand for 
unemployment insurance, while firms increased their use of early retirement 
and disability pensions to shed older and less productive workers (Manow 
1997a).20 Unemployment and labour force exit meant a smaller .base of wages 
and salaries from which to finance growing demands for social insurance, 
so that by 1996, social insurance contributions had risen to nearly 41 per 
cent of wages (OECO 1996d: 76, and see Table 11.3). At the same time, 
German firms were coming under considerable competitive pressures from 
19 Ambulatory physicians receive fee-for-service reimbursement, but their level of payments 
may be adjusted downward over the course of the year in order to remain within the cap. 
20 The welfare state accoun ted for approximately 18% of the transfers to eastern Germany 
up through 1995, largely for unemployment benefits and early retirement pensions. Not 
surprisingly, these funds incurred enormous deficits as a result (see Heilemann and R appen 
1997: 13, J5). 
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TABLE 11.3. Social insurance and health care contribution rates in Germany, .1960- 96 
(as % of gross wages) 
Year 
1960a 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
J993b 
1995 
1996 
Employer- employee 
joint contribution rate 
to social insurance 
24.4 
26.5 
30.5 
32.4 
35.1 
35.6 
37.4 
39.3 
41.0 
Average contribution 
ra te to sickness funds 
8.4 
8.2 
10.5 
11.4 
11.8 
12.6 
13.4 
13.2 
13.6 
" 1960: blue-collar workers ' funds only; after 1960, all funds. 
b Since 1991, western German states only. 
Source: Manow 1997a: Federal Ministry of Labor. 
globalization and the completion of Europe's single market. As a result, 
employers began to call upon government to stabilize social insurance out-
lays in order to help them bring their labour costs under control. In this 
they found support from scholars and policy makers who argued that high 
social insurance contributions were partly responsible for pricing labour out 
of the market, especially in lower productivity services (Esping-Andersen 
1996c; OECD 1996d: ch. 3; Scharpf 1997b). 
Even though pensions comprised the largest share of the social insur-
ance bill and policy makers had reined in the medical inflation of the 1970s, 
health care costs remained a concern. Indeed, health care costs began to 
accelerate again from the late 1980s, and Germany had the dubious honour 
of ranking second in the OECD in health spending (OECD 1997b: 68- 71 ; 
OECD 1998e). While some of the rise in expenditures lay in demographic 
developments and the costs of unification, inefficiencies within the health 
sector itself were also responsible. Chief among these was the per-diem reim-
bursement of hospitals, which encouraged unusually long in-patient stays. 
Another was the imbalance in the relationship between doctors and in-
surers. Corporatist self-governance was premissed on the KVs and sickness 
funds being in rough balance so that each could act as a counterweight to 
the other. But the reality was different. The KVs exploited their monopoly 
position in the face of a fragmented insurers side to negotiate generous 
fee settlements (Stone 1980). Thus, if record joblessness made it difficult 
to justify slashing unemployment insurance or early retirement pensions, 
the health sector seemed long overdue for efforts to seek out economies 
(Hinrichs 1995). 
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The Kohl Government's health care cost-containment strategy involved 
a mixed menu of delegating new policy tasks to corporatist actors, a careful 
experiment with market competition, and limited cost-sharing by patie~ts. 
The 1988 Health Care Reform Law (GRG) relied on the usual method of 
corporatist delegation of policy tasks to doctors and insurers. Thus, the law 
required payers and providers to follow the goal of stable contribution rates 
in their collective agreements on remuneration, and mandated doctors' and 
insurers' associations to negotiate maximum prices for pharmaceuticals as 
well as practice guidelines with which to monitor physician prescribing and 
ensure that doctors practised cost-effective and .clinically consistent medicine. 
The GRG also introduced minor co-payments on prescription drugs and 
hospital stays. But insurance contributions continued to rise, and the Kohl 
Government blamed the doctors for refusing to implement many aspects of 
the law. 
Frustrated with the apparent failures of corporatist self-governance, the 
government passed the Health Care Structural Reform Law (GSG) in 1992. 
With this law, policy makers invoked their reserve powers to suspend doctors' 
and insurers' self-governance rights. Thus, the health ministry set budgets 
by decree for all areas of the health care system for three years, mandated 
a two-year price freeze for prescription drugs, and forced the medical asso-
ciations to assume financial liability for cost overruns in physician prescrib-
ing. The law also promulgated slight increases in patient co-payments. Most 
important, the law introduced market competition among payers. Beginning 
in 1997, all patients were granted free choice of insurer. But a financial risk-
adjustment scheme among sickness funds preceded choice of insurer in order 
to level the playing field among funds with very different health risks. 
However, Kohl was not eager to have the state permanently enmeshed 
in the administrative domain of doctors and insurers. But neither could be 
afford a cost surge in the health sector once the budgets were lifted.21 Kohl's 
answer to this dilemma was the two Health Care Restructuring Laws of 1997 
(NOG 1 and 2). Under the· NOGs, the state retreated from setting budgets 
for most subsectors of the health care system, returned to free collective 
bargaining between the KVs and insurers, and even extended the scope of 
their negotiations to the setting of practice guidelines for other subsectors 
of the health care system. But even as the government reiterated its commit-
ment to corporatist self-governance, it compensated for the lifting of budgets 
on providers wi~h a greater reliance on market competition among insurers 
and cost-sharing by patients. Hence, the NOG required that if a fund raised 
its contribution rate, it would have to increase its co-payments by the same 
2 1 As a short-term response to employers, the government enacted the Contribution Relief 
Act (Beitragsenrlastungsgesetz) in 1996. That law required all funds to cut their contribution 
rates by 0.7% for 1997 (OECD 1997b: 85). 
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percentage. But patients facing a hike in contributions and co-payments would 
be free to switch insurers without the usual waiting period. In effect, the 
government's budgeting policy shifted from the sectoral level to that of the 
individual sickness fund. 22 The government reasoned that this would put ~ick­
ness funds under severe pressure to not raise their rates and to instead take 
a tougher line in their negotiations with providers. Finally, the government 
also introduced provisions that required greater cost-sharing from patients: 
co-payments were now to be Linked to the development of wages and salaries, 
while marginal benefits were struck from the statutory insurance catalogue 
and offered as 'extras' for patients to purchase from insurers.23 
The NOGs signalled a shifting of the burden of cost containment onto 
patients and insurers. But they were far less drastic than some of the pro-
posals considered during the reform debates between 1995 and 1997. The key 
goal was to relieve employers' of their share of non-wage labour costs. The 
most radical proposal would have called for employers' exit from financing 
health insurance altogether and substituting parity financing with com-
pulsory, individual insurance borne solely by workers. However, a 'wage 
subsidy' would have compensated employees for this new expense.24 
This proposal failed, however, not only because unions and the Social 
Democratic Party (SOP) predictably opposed it, but also because employers 
themselves had little interest in it. Employers argued that the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP) proposal would not have solved the problem of 
labour costs, but would have merely shifted the battle to the collective bar-
gaining arena, where unions would have certainly demanded higher wages 
as compensation for the substantial new health insurance costs borne by 
their members ('Haarscharf' 1995). Furthermore, employers reasoned that 
relief from the responsibility of financing health care would also mean 
losing their representation on sickness funds' boards and their ability to influ-
ence health policy more generally ('Haarscharf ' 1995). Finally, the coalition 
government itself was by no means of a common mind on the proposal. The 
CDU's trade union wing was adamantly opposed to it on the grounds that 
it violated the principles of parity financing and administration of health 
22 Manow has made this point in G iaimo and Manow (1999). 
23 The 1996 Contribution Relief Act removed the marginal benefits from the statutory 
catalogue. For details on the 1997 laws, see Dienst fiir Gesellschaftspo/itik (20 Feb. 1997 and 
27 Mar. 1997); Giaimo 1998; Giaimo and Manow 1999; and Manow 1997b. 
24 The strongest backer of this proposal was the F ree Democratic Party in Kohl 's coalition 
government. 'Union und FOP geben einander die Schuld am Abbruch der Gesprache tiber die 
G esundbeitsreform ', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 9 Oct. 1995, 1- 2; 'Wettbewerb 
zwischen Krankenkassen soli verstiirkt werden', FAZ, 15 Dec. 1995, I; 'Haarscharf wieder so', 
Der Spiegel, 23 Oct. 1995, 30- 1. The reform debate also considered more solidaristic pro-
posals (such as taxing sources of income beyond wages and salaries, or bringing io segments 
of the population exempt from statutory insurance). For a discussion of the range of pro-
posals considered between 1995 and 1997, see Giaimo 1998; Hinrichs 1995: 637- 79; Advisory 
Council for the Concerted Action in H ealth Care 1995:44- 7, and 1997: 32- 46). For a recent 
d iscussion of reform alternatives, see OECD 1997b. 
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care, while the health minister was fundamentally at odds with the FOP's 
neoliberal vision of individual responsibility and market provision for health 
care ('Die FDP unter Druck', FAZ , 9 Oct. 1995, I; ' Haarscharf ' 1995) .. 
The interactions amo ng actors in the German health care system, the 
broader political economy, and the political arena thus produced an over-
all reform pattern during the Kohl era that required a balancing of the goals 
of cost control with equity. All three arenas affected the strategic calcula-
tions of payers and policy makers and made it difficult for any one actor 
to pursue cost containment at the expense of other players. The health care 
system itself has lirruted the room for manoeuvre of employers, but so has 
its relationship to the larger political economy. Thus, the statutory .nature 
of heal th insurance did not allow employers lo reduce their labour costs 
by refusing to provide health insurance or by unilaterally curbing benefits. 
Moreover, even when given the option of exit, employers refused to take 
it because they recognized that they face a formidable counterweight in 
employees' presence in health insurance financing and administration, as well 
as in union strength in collective bargaining.25 Business leaders knew that 
victory in one arena could just as easily translate into setbacks in ano ther, 
and they saw their role in statutory social insurance as a valuable lever to 
control non-wage labour costs. 
The German political system also granted key health care stakeholders a 
number of avenues to shape the content of reform legislation. The political 
parties and federalism were the chief avenues of influence for employees 
as well as employers. Both of the two main politicaJ parties- the Christian 
Democratic Union (CD U) and the SPD are heterogeneous Volksparteien or 
'catch-all parties' (Kirchheimer 1966) representing the interests of employ-
ees and vulnerable groups in the population. The CD U institutiona lizes 
both a business and Catholic trade union wing in separate internal party 
committees. The trade union wing of the CDU, with jurisdiction over the 
party's social policy matters, was the driving force behind the hardship 
exemptions on co-payments that featured in all of the health care reform 
laws. The GSG's measures reducing the disparities in choice of insurer and 
in contribution rates between blue- and white-collar workers were the prod-
uct of a cross-patty deal between the CDU's trade union wing and the oppo-
sition SPD in 1992. This 'de facto grand coalition' between the CDU and SPD 
was an expression of federalism and the Social Democrats' majority in the 
legislative upper house (Bundesrat), as well as of the ideological a ffinity 
between the CDU's labour wing and the SPD's moderate wing on the social 
market economy (sozia/e Marktwirtschaft) and a comprehensive welfare state. 
25 German unions only organize 35% of the labour force, but state extension of collect-
ive agreements grants them fa r more influence than membership numbers would suggest. 
Unions and employees are a lso firmly entrenched in the governance of the firm thiough 
co-determination arra ngements. 
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But health politics and policies also were shaped by electoral outcomes and 
coalition politics. Encouraged by its improved showing. in state elections in 
1996, the FDP became a more pugnacious coalition partner eager to dis-
. tinguish itself from the CDU and refusing to countenance further deals 
with the SPD. On top of this, Kohl's Government had only a razor-thin 
majority in the lower house (Bundestag) after 1994. To keep his fractious 
coalition together, Kohl had to yield to the FDP more than he had in the 
past. With the NOGs, then, the FDP played its familiar role as the patron of 
physicians and small business. Along with pressure from the CDU's business 
wing, whose influence had increased as the economic climate had deteriorated, 
Kohl chose the NOGs' provisions to stabilize employers' labour costs at the 
expense of patients and sickness funds. 
Finally, the national insurance system both constrained and empowered 
state actors in the task of health care reform. Because national insurance 
guarantees all persons the same access to services based on medical need, 
and is modelled on contributory social insurance, it is very difficult for the 
state to pursue austerity at the expense of any one class or subgroup of 
the population. At the same time, however, the corporatist arrangements in 
the national insurance system provide the state with the legal authority 
and the institutional means-through its leverage over public-law bodies-to 
mandate cost-containment tasks on health care actors and to set the terms 
of market competition in ways that do not compromise the equity and 
solidarity of the system. 
How, then, should we judge the Kohl Government's record on balancing 
costs and equity? Had they been fully implemented, it is clear that the NOGs 
would have shifted the burden of welfare state and economic adjustment 
from employers to patients. Dynamized co-payments and the linking of con-
tribution to co-payment increases implied a gradual movement away from 
the principle of parity financing, since employees already paid half of the 
insurance contribution and patients would have also had to assume a grow-
ing portion of health care costs out of their own pocket (Manow l997b). 
But in important respects, the Kohl Government's policies largely preserved 
the equity of the health care system, and in some cases, even extended it. 
Health insurance has remained universal and the statutory catalogue of bene-
fits generous; the services struck from the catalogue in 1996 were quite 
marginal. Hardship clauses have exempted low-income persons from the 
co-payment requirement or otherwise set a ceiling on the amount that those 
with chronic conditions would have to pay. And the government designed 
market forces in such a way as to advance both efficiency and equity con-
cerns. Thus, insurers cannot compete on the basis of fewer benefits to woo 
healthier members but instead must · accept all applicants and must offer, 
at a minimum, the same health services to all members contained in the 
catalogue of statutory benefits. Significantly, competition has granted wage 
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earners·nearly identical rights of choice of insurer as those long enjoyed by 
salaried employees. Likewise, the risk adjustment scheme has required sub-
stantial financial transfers from the company and white-collar funds, which 
had a history of healthier and wealthier members, to the local funds, which 
had had to levy higher contributions to cover the health care costs of their 
poorer and sicker blue-collar members. The risk-adjustment scheme has also 
narrowed contribution rates considerably among funds, to the benefit of blue-
collar workers.26 The risk-adjustment programme also reduces the temptation 
· of sickness funds to compete by cream-skimming the healthier c;tnd wealthier 
persons, since they know they will have to make payments to funds with poorer 
health risk profiles. Finally, the most controversial provisions of the 1997 laws 
did not get very far in practice. Fearing punishment from voters in the 1998 
elections, the Kohl Government refrained from implementing the provisions 
linking co-payments and contributions, while Kohl's Social Democratic 
successor, Gerhard Schroder, suspended the dynamization of co-payments 
and other market-like measures (Manow 1997b; Schneider 1998).27 
Under Kohl's watch, the cost performance of the German health care 
system has also been respectable. To be sure, health insurance contribution 
rates have risen nearly every year, but the pace has been moderate: the 
average contribution rate, which stood at 12.6 per cent in 1990, was only 
13.6 per cent in 1996 (Manow 1997a: table 3), despite the burdens of an 
ageing population, recession, and unification. This is not to say that Germany 
has found a way to permanently halt the upward trajectory of health 
care spending. But it has so far held the line and should be seen as an inter-
mediate case between the tight-fistedness and unmet demand of Britain and 
the profligacy and cost-shifting of the United States. 
The United States: The Triumph of 'Unmanaged 
Competition' and the Defeat of Equity 
The most striking feature of the American health care system is the 
absence of a statutory universal health care programme and an employment-
based fringe benefits system in its stead. Most Americans look to their 
employers to prov.ide health insurance, while public programmes are confined 
26 One fund, for example, ·had to pay approximately half of its revenues to the risk adjust-
ment fund (OECD 1997: 107). In 1993, approximately 32% of funds levied contribution rates 
I% above or below the average. In 1996, less than 100/r, of the funds did so (Ministry of Health, 
cited in Giaimo and Manow 1999: 982). 
27 Kohl's successor, Gerhard Schroder, announced upon taking office that his SPD-Green 
government would not introduce the linkage provisions, and abolished the provision for dynamiz-
ing co-payments and some of the other market-like mechanisms, such as premium rebates for 
healthy patients, that the 1997 laws had introduced. The Schroder Government also reimposed 
legal budgets on all subsectors of the health care system as an interim cost control measure 
until it devised a comprehensive reform scheduled for the year 2000 (Schneider 1998). 
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to designated categories of the population, such as the elderly, disabled, the 
military, and the very poorest in society. Such arrangements make employers 
the pivotal players in the health care system and health care politics. They 
are free to decide whether or not to provide insurance as a fringe benefit, 
and when they do, most companies pay the bulk of the insurance premium 
(at least of the cheapest health plan). Unions offer little in the way of counter-
vailing power because they have little or no presence in the workplace and 
no role in welfare state administration . 28 Likewise, gove-rnment actors have 
few mechanisms to control the behaviour of employers and insurers in a 
voluntary, private fringe benefits system. State governments have limited 
regulatory authority over the employment-based insurance sector, while the 
federal government's reach is even more at arm's length. 
Because of this patchwork system, the US health care system has 
always been plagued by costly gaps in access. The uninsured had access 
to emergency hospital care, and the safety-net providers who treated them 
recouped their losses by charging patients with private insurance higher fees. 
Insurers, in turn, passed on their cost increases to employers by charging 
them higher premiums (Reinhardt 1992). Thus, an elaborate but largely 
hidden cost-shifting game was being played, but with only some employers 
footing the bill. Rationing access by ability to pay was both inequitable and 
inefficient: it burdened vulnerable groups in society, encouraged free-riding 
by Jess efficient firms, and discouraged the uninsured from seeking out less 
expensive preventive care instead of costly hospital care. 
But other reasons besides gaps in access and resultant cost-shifting were 
behind the high costs of the US health care system. Most physicians received 
fee-for-service payments for their services while hospitals were reimbursed for 
their costs, which gave them little incentive to seek out less expensive alternat-
ives. Insurers largely paid what doctors billed without questioning treatme.nt 
decisions, thereby deferring to physicians' economic and clinical freedom. The 
USA never had a mechanism like global budgeting to limit overall health care 
expenditures. Nor was there an effective system for controlling the diffusion 
of medical technology.29 And until the adven t of managed care, the USA 
had no gatekeeper system to limit access to specialists or to hospitals. 
The cost-shifting game did not arouse too much complaint from em-
ployers as long as the economy kept growing and American businesses were 
shielded from the effects of competition. But a number of factors converged 
to undermine firms' willingness to underwrite the care of the uninsured. 
F irst, medical inflation began to rise steeply in the 1980s (see Table 11.4). 
211 There are some exceptions, however. Some unions finance and administer insurance funds 
for their members. And employers who choose to self-finance their own health plans may 
directly administer these plans. But in many cases, employers contract with an insurance com-
pany for administration . 
29 On state efforts to control high technology in hospitals, see Russell 1979. 
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TABLE 11.4. Changes in medical care costs compared to Consumer 
Price Index, US ( 1967 = 100) 
Year CPI Total Medicine H ospital Physicians · 
1960 88.7 79.1 57.3 77.0 
1965 94.5 89.5 75.9 88.3 
1970 116.3 120.6 145.4 121.4 
1975 J61.2 168.6 236.1 169.4 
1980 246.8 265.9 418.9 269.3 
1985 326.6 413.0 722.5 407.9 
1990 421.8 592.9 1096.1 533. 1 
1995 49l.4 817.6 1577.1 692.5 
1996 512.5 847.8 1638.6 7 17.0 
Source: Peters 1999: 251: Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
Employers' health insurance premiums escalated at double-digit annual 
rates in the 1980s; between 1987 and 1993, employers' insurance premiums 
rose 90 per cent (Cooper and Schone 1997: 142). 
More tellingly, the spike in health care inflation coincided with broader 
changes in the American economy since the 1970s. The shift to a post-
industrial economy brought with it the disappearance of unionized jobs in 
manufacturing that had come with generous fringe benefits. In their place 
arose service sector jobs, temporary positions, and subcontracted labour 
in both manufacturing and services. Such contingent labour was one of the 
chief means for employers to hold down their labour costs, since these jobs 
often paid much lower wages than unionized jobs in manufacturing and did 
not come with health insurance and other fringe benefits (R. Freeman 1994).30 
Thus, the shifts in the American economy swelled the ranks of the uninsured, 
adding to the cross-subsidy burden of employers who did provide insurance. 
As their health insurance bills rose, these firms complained that they were at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to their domestic rivals who did not pro-
vide insurance, or to those foreign competitors with lower labour costs. 
As the 1980s wore on, employers who provided insurance becrune less will-
ing to shoulder the access and cost deficiencies in the health care system. 
Many of them began to look to government to relieve them of their cross-
subsidy burden through a national health insurance solution (C. J. Martin 
I995a). Those advocating national insurance found a sympathetic ally in 
President Bill Clinton, who wanted to control the costs of public insurance 
30 The proportion of uninsured Americans had declined throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 
the 1980s as a result of the expansion of Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-based insurance. 
However, the downward trend began to reverse itself in the late 1980s. Most of the uninsured 
were those in the labour market (Banks, Kunz, and Macdonald 1994: 19). In 1987, 14.8%, or 
31.8 miJlion non-elderly Americans had no insurance. By 1995, that figure bad risen to 17.4% 
of the non-elderly population, or 40.3 million persons (EBRI 1997). 
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p'rogramrnes, address employers' competitiveness concerns, and stem the 
rising tide of the uninsured. 
With his plan for national health insurance and government-structured 
market competition, Clinton sought to solve both the cost and access 
problems simultaneously.31 First, Clinton's Health Security plan would have 
required all firms to provide insurance, with the government subsidizing the 
costs to small firms or those individuals unable to obtain insurance through 
the workplace. Pooling all risks within a national insurance system would 
have achieved universal access and ended the cost-shifting and free-riding 
by firms that did not provide insurance. Second, Health Security mandated 
market competition among both providers and insurers to control health 
care costs, while largely pinning its hopes on health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) to bring cost discipline to the market. By restricting patients' 
access to hospitals and specialists, HMOs tended to be much cheaper than 
other types of health plans. More expensive insurers would either have to 
reduce their costs to retain patients or else charge higher premiums and impose 
cost-sharing for additional benefits or greater choice of provider.32 
Third, government actors would have played a leading role in structuring 
the market to ensure universal access and to prevent insurers and providers 
from engaging in competitive practices that harmed the sicker and poorer. 
States would have been key actors in this regard by establishing quasi-public 
'health alliances' on a regional basis to ensure that small businesses and 
individuals had access to affordable coverage. In short, alliances would have 
organized the market and 'managed' the competition through extensive mon-
itoring of insurers to prevent them from cream-skimming (Starr 1994: 53, 
102). Large companies that self-insured could have chosen to opt out of the 
state alliances and instead constitute their own alliances (C. J. Martin 1995b). 
Finally, the Clinton plan would have expanded the federal government's 
reach over employment-based insurance. The Health Security Act would have 
legislated a minimum but comprehensive benefits package that all plans had 
to offer. In addition, a National Health Board, with members appointed 
by the President, would have possessed wide-ranging powers to regulate alli-
ances and health plans. And because the Clinton administration doubted 
that competition alone could control costs, the National Health Board would 
have had the authority to enforce a global budget cap over the entire health 
care system by limiting insurers' premium increases to the rate of inflation 
(Starr 1994). 
31 Unless otherwise noted, the description of the Clinton plan is drawn from the Wltite House 
Domestic Policy Council (WHDPC 1993). Clinton's plan drew heavily on Stanford health 
economist Alain Enthoven 's theory of managed competition (see Enthoven 1988, 1993). 
32 Employers would have shouldered 80% of the premium of the cheapest plan. with 
employees paying the 20o/o balance plus any addjtional premium costs if they chose more 
expensive plans. 
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Clinton's effort to introduce national health insurance came to an inglori-
ous end, but this did not mean that health care reform was dead. Rather, 
transformation of the health care system continued apace at breathtaking 
scope and speed, with employers leading the charge in an uncoordinated, 
every firm-for-itself strategy. The centrepiece of this strategy was the deploy-
ment of competition against insurers and providers. Under pressure from 
employers to hold the line on premiums, managed care plans negotiated steep 
price discounts or capitation arrangements with doctors and hospitals.33 Many 
employers also sought to control their health care costs by offering workers 
only one health plan, often an inexpensive HMO. ·Others rushed to self-insure 
in .order to escape state risk-pools for the unin~ured and other consumer 
regulations. In addition, employers engaged in a number of strategies that 
shifted their costs onto weaker market actors. For instance, companies re-
quired their workers to shoulder a greater share of insurance premiums or 
co-payments or curtailed the range of benefits that health insurance plans 
offered. Finally, some companies exercised their ultimate exit option by refus-
ing to provide coverage at all (Giaimo 1996; Giaimo and Manow 1999). 
Employers' strategies to contain their labour costs are best characterized as 
'unmanaged competition' (Giaimo 1996), in which the application of market 
forces in health care has proceeded in the absence of an effective regulatory 
framework that would prohibit or compensate for market failures. Federal 
and state government controls over employers' and insurers' cost-cutting prac-
tices have been piecemeal, weak, or non-existent. Where government action 
bas occurred, it has largely taken the form of incremental regulation of the 
insurance market to foster competition, as with federal and state oversight 
of mergers (Given 1997), or to make it conform to the dictates of the larger 
economy (Giaimo and Manow 1999). 34 The absence of a framework of rules 
over the market has permitted insurers to continue to segment the market 
and shun the worst health risks. And the absence of effective consumer pro-
tections in the world of managed care has also provoked a public backlash 
against the rationing decisions of HMOs (Blendon et al. 1998). 
33 By 1997, 85% of employees were in some type of managed care plan, up from slightly more 
than 28% in 1988 (Milt Freudenheim, To Economists, Managed Care is No Cure-All', New 
York Times, 6 Sept. 1994, A I, A I 0; Freudenheim, ' Health Insurers Seek Big Increases in their 
Premiums' , New York Times, 24 Apr. J 998, A I, C4). For an excellent survey of recent managed 
care developments, see.Wilkerson, Devers, and Given 1997: esp. ch. I and conclusion chapter. 
The editors point out that while managed care plans have a long history, the phenomenon 
of intensified price cumpetition among these health plans is a recent development. 
34 The 1996 Kassebaum- Kennedy Act was an attempt to respond to employers' concerns 
with 'job-lock' by barring insurers from denying coverage to new employees with pre-existing 
medjcal conditions. But because the law made no provision that premiums would be afford-
able and allowed insurers to impose a waiting period before coverage began, it fell far short 
of its goal (Fuchs et a!. 1997; GAO 1998; Robert Pear, 'Clinton to Punish Insurers Who Deny 
Health Coverage', New York Times, 7 July 1998, AI, Al3). 
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How can we understand a reform path that started out as a solidaristic 
. attempt at national insurance but ended up as atomistic cost-shifting at the 
·expense of broader solidarity? The explanation lies in the critical role played 
by employers, their inability to forge a common line around a solidaristic 
solution to their labour costs problem, and the voluntarism of the fringe 
benefits system that instead encouraged their go-it-alone strategies of cost 
containment. Employers were critical to the fate of the Clinton plan because 
they financed health insurance and would have continued to do so under 
Health Security. As a result, the Clinton plan was held hostage to the veto 
of business. Firms' disarray in the political arena mirrored their actions 
in the health care system itself, with employers organizationally incapable 
of delivering support to the President. Moreover, the voluntarism of the 
American health insurance system encouraged employers to pursue multi-
ple go-it-alone cost-containment strategies and blocked effective government 
action to limit their behaviour in ways that would protect solidarity. Let us 
consider each of these points in turn. 
First, a firm's particular position in the health care system shaped its 
approach to controlling labour costs and the attitudes of its managers 
towards reform. For some employers, the voluntarism of the fringe benefits 
system aided them in their quest for low labour costs, but for others, it was 
a big part of the problem. As we have seen, many employers who already 
provided insurance blamed their high labour costs on the free-riding of their 
colleagues who did not offer coverage, and supported national insurance to 
level the competitive playing field among them. Most small businesses, by 
contrast, saw the voluntarism of employment-based insurance as vital to their 
economic survival; the freedom to not provide insurance was what allowed 
them to keep their labour costs at competitive levels. Not surprisingly, they 
vehemently opposed the Clinton plan on the grounds that it would saddle 
them with ruinously high labour costs. But even among firms that provided 
insurance, there were those who rejected the Clinton plan because they 
feared that it would have meant higher costs. Either they would have been 
forced into regional alliances and would have paid higher premiums in order 
to subsidize insurance for small businesses. Or, if they were large enough to 
constitute their own alliances, they ran the risk that the even larger regional 
alliances would have negotiated better rates from insurers and left them 
with higher premiums (Judis 1995; C. J. Martin 1995a, l995b ). For different 
reasons, then, these employers believed they could better control their own 
costs by 'going-it-alone'. 
Second, the business community proved incapable of forging a common 
line on health care reform, in large part because the health care system granted 
its member firms multiple ways to control their labour costs, including not 
providing insurance at all. The freedom of action in the health care system, 
in turn, aggravated employers' collective action problems in the political arena. 
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_Employers' peak associations- perenni.ally weak, fragmented, and lacking 
sanctions over recalcitrant members- proved ·unable to overcome the cen-
trifugal tendencies within their ranks to rally their members to support the 
Clinton plan at the criticar legislative stage. Associations representing large 
and medium-sized firms remained on the sidelines and left the field open 
to small business, whose association waged a highly effective ~ampaign of 
opposition.35 Third, many businesses deemed Clinton's attempt to claim a 
greater government role in employment-based insurance as an illegitimate 
intrusion into their domain of corporate governance. Some employers- and 
not just small businesses-opposed Clinton's national insurance proposal 
because the employer mandate and statutory benefits package would. have 
encroached upon their freedom to decide on insurance coverage for their 
employees. Others were even more alarmist, arguing that national insurance 
was an entering wedge for government intrusion into other areas of cor-
porate governance (Judis 1995). 
Subsequent government attempts to regulate the health care market 
after the Clinton plan's defeat have met with similar failure. Employers and 
insurers continue to regard government efforts to regulate employer-based 
health plans as iJJegitimate and as saddling them with unwanted costs. More-
over, the perversities of federalism have meant that state and federal officials 
work at cross-purposes, blocking one another's efforts to expand access or enact 
adequate consumer protections on employment-based insurance. The biggest 
obstacle is the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), which 
permits states to regulate private insurance but not employers' self-insured 
health plans. Not surprisingly, employers have seized upon self-insurance 
to avoid cooptation into state risk-pools for the uninsured and to evade state 
consumer protection regulations for private insurers. At the same time, 
however, federal regulation of self-insured plans and employer-based health 
insurance more generally is notoriously weak. The result is a dual system 
of government regulation that. shields self-insured plans- whose numbers are 
increasing- from regulations that apply to other types of private insurers.36 
35 For accounts of business organizations' disarray towards the Cbnton plan, see Adam 
Clymer, Robert Pear, ·and Robin Toner, 'For Health Care, Time Was a Killer', New York 
Times, 29 Aug. 1994, AI , A8- 9; Judis 1995; Jurek Martin, 'Business Snubs Clinton Health 
Bill' , Financial Times, 4 Feb: 1994, 5; Skocpol 1996; and Robin Toner, 'Autopsy on Health 
Care', N ew York Times, 27 Sept. 1994, AI ff. 
36 For a discussion of ERISA, see Acs et al. 1996; Chirba-Martin and Brennan 1994; GAO 
1995; Grogan 1995; O'Keefe 1995; and Polzer and Butler 1997. Seventy-eight per cent of com-
panies with I ,000 or more employees and 89% with 20,000 or more employees were self-insured 
in 1993. Self-insurance has beeri growing: among firms with at least 100 employees, 46% of 
employees were enrolled in self-insured plans in 1993, compared to only 28% in 1986 (GAO 
1995: 12- 13). The Clinton administration bad pushed for comprehensive consumer protection 
legislation at the federal level to regulate the rationing decisions by HMOs. But its efforts 
became bogged down in the impeachment scandal (see Giaimo and Man ow J 999; R. Pear, 
'Senators Reject Bill to Regulate Care by HMOs', New York Times, 10 Oct. 1998, AI , A8). 
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· Health care reform through the market, led by private actors in the 
absence of public rules, has worrying implications for the achievement of both 
cost control and equitable access and financing. On the positive side, the 
USA experienced a noticeable slowing in health care outlays between 1993 
and 1996. The spread of managed care plans in the private sector, with their 
restricted access to hospitals and specialists and their reliance on capitation 
or discounts to pay providers, has wrung out much of the excess capacity in 
the health care system and is responsible for much of the slowdown in health 
care outlays (Levit et al. 1998; S. Smith et al. 1998). However, it may be that 
the days of easy savings have come to an end, as mergers and acquisitions 
among plans and providers reach a saturation point (S. Smith et al. 1998). 
Indeed, after slowing considerably in the last few years, employers' health 
insurance premiums are set to rise substantially, as insurers seek to recover 
lost profits after years of belt-tightening.37 
Moreover, cost savings for some have been realized at the expense of equity. 
While insurers have recently hiked their premiums, the biggest increases have 
fallen on small firms and individuals, not large companies.38 In addition, firms' 
and insurers' cost-cutting strategies have segmented the market further and 
threaten what little solidarity there is in the health care system. The current 
trend shows the number of uninsured growing as employers-willingly or 
otherwise- exercise their exit option and refuse to offer coverage or as 
low-wage workers find insurance premiums beyond their reach (Cooper and 
Schone 1997). Those individuals with insurance coverage are also bearing 
a greater share of their health care costs. Finally, continued cost-shifting 
to weaker market players only aggravates the problem of the uninsured, as 
small firms and individuals find themselves priced out of the market by 
exorbitant premiums. The 'worst case' scenario predicts the disintegration 
of public hospital 'providers of last resort' and more restricted access for 
the most vulnerable members of society as employers' and insurers' cost-
cutting actions, along with cuts in government programmes, destroy the 
cross-subsidy for the uninsured. 39 Thus, absent effective public intervention, 
37 Real per capita health spending averaged just below 5% per year between 1970 and 1993. 
Between 1993 and I 996. it averaged only 1.5% per year. But it is set to grow at 3.4% per year 
from 1997 to 2007, with the percentage ofGDP predicted to rise to 16.6% in 2007 (S. Smith 
et al. I 998: 128- 9). 
Js Milt Freudenheim, 'Health Care Costs Edging Up and a Bigger Surge is Feared', New 
York Times, 21 Jan. 1997, AI, D 20; Freudenheim, ' Health [nsurers Seek Big Increases in 
their Premiums', New York Times, 24 Apr. 1998, AI , C4. Ln addition to cost-shifting from 
stronger to weaker market players, the higher costs may be due to patients demanding greater 
choice of physician, and doctors orgaruzing to counteract the growth of HMOs. 
39 For evidence of the 'worst case' scenario and the threat to the public hospital system. 
see the Los Angeles Times series in October 1995. Reinhardt (1995) paints a somewhat less 
pessimistic portrait, but one that still envisions safety-net providers bearing the brunt of the 
burden. 
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the ultimate logic of employer-led, go-it-alone strategies threatens both the 
cost-containment goals of many individual firms as well as the survival of 
the health care system itself. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The health care reform experiences suggest broader lessons for the politics 
of welfare state adjustment in the twenty-first century. The first lesson is that 
payers have become the driving force behind reform and they are likely to 
remain important actors in the poli tics of welfare state adjustment as long 
as economic difficulties associated with globalization or the post-industrial 
economy continue. But this should not lead to the conclusion that their views 
will always prevail. The terms of welfare state adjustment will depend on 
the presence of countervailing forces in the particular welfare state and polit-
ical arena·in each country. 
Second, employers (and governments) are undeniably worried about the 
welfare state's effects on competitiveness. But their concerns need not trans-
late into a policy stance that is anti-welfare state or anti-solidaristic. As the 
accounts of health care reform in the USA and Germany illustrate, many 
companies may favour a statutory, solidaristic solution because it pools risks 
and levels the competitive playing field among them. This suggests that 
employers' views towards the welfare state will depend on whether they see it 
as compatible with their competitiveness strategies. The strategies employers 
choose to contain their labour costs, in turn, will in part depend on the type 
of welfare state in which they find themselves and the freedom of action it 
grants or denies them to do so. 
Thus, there is no one welfare state that best serves the cause of com-
petitiveness, or even one particular welfare state type that automatically 
corresponds to a particular political economy. Instead, a number of different 
welfare state regimes may 'fi t' together with the other components of a 
nation's political economy.40 Thus, a voluntary fringe benefits system like that 
in the USA is an integral part of a broader liberal political economy, and is 
a critical part of a strategy of competition based on rock-bottom prices and 
low skills/low labour costs because it allows firms the freedom to not pro-
vide benefits. Of course, it also creates difficulties for other firms who must 
40 Put another way, there may be more 'varieties of capitalism' than the literature com-
monly assumes. The varieties of capitalism literature sketches only two models of capitalism: 
coordinated and liberal market economies. And it is only beginning to systematicaUy integrate 
welfare states into its analysis. For examples of the varieties of capitalism literature, see Crouch 
and Streeck 1997; Hall 1998. For efforts to integrate the welfare state into varieties of 
capitalism models, see Ebbinghaus and Manow 1998; and Manow 1997a. 
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subsidize their compatriots' free-riding. The danger is that free-riding will 
gradually undermine this form of social provision, as more and more employ-
ers drop coverage to contain their labour costs. 
But a tax-financed, state-administered system like the British NHS can 
be equally compatible with company strategies to compete on low prices 
and labour costs characteristic of a liberal political economy. Indeed, one 
reason that a social democratic oasis like the NHS could survive in Britain's 
neoliberal desert- aside from its track record of delive~g low health care 
spending and its broad political popularity- was precisely because it did 
not threaten a competitiveness strategy premissed on low price and labour 
costs that Thatcher and employers advocated. A social insurance system 
like Germany's would seemingly pose the biggest disadvantage for firms 
seeking competitiveness through lower labour costs. Yet, as we have seen, 
employers have not been eager to part with their role in the social insurance 
system because it has provided them a lever over labour costs outside of 
collective bargaining.41 This is a considerable advantage in a political economy 
that features a strong union presence in both industrial relations and in 
welfare state administration. 
Third, some of the arguments advanced in welfare state reform debates 
argue for a roll-back of government and more privatization. But the health 
care reform experiences show that employment-based fringe benefits systems 
are a poor substitute for statutory social insurance programmes. As Esping-
Andersen (1990) has noted, different welfare state regimes embody differ-
ent kinds of social rights. In statutory universal systems, social rights are 
broadly defined and firmly anchored in the law. In fringe benefits systems, 
however, social rights rest on a precarious foundation. They depend on the 
economic power of unions to secure them through collective bargaining or 
on the discretion of employers to provide them, and generally do not have 
the legal backing of the state. This is not to imply that universal, statutory 
programmes are immutable or permanent, or that they should not or can-
not adapt to new realities. But they may be harder to dislodge because they 
have a broader spectrum of the population interested in preserving them. 
And because they incorporate redistribution within their design, they may 
prove better able to adapt in ways that safeguard equity. 
The task for all advanced industrialized societies is to adapt their welfare 
states to new economic and demographic challenges in ways that reconcile 
efficiency with equity. However, the outcome is likely to be quite different in 
welfare states with different kinds of social rights and social forces. Private 
41 Mares (1997a) and Swenson (1997) likewise found that firms have good economic reasons 
for wanting universal social programmes. Employers may also value their administrative 
role in social insurance if it provides them with a painless way to rationalize production 
and shed unneeded labour onto the broader risk community (see Manow l 997a; Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997). 
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, fringe benefits systems appear to have a .bleak future. Lacking countervailing 
forces to challenge or curb employers' freedom to pursue exit options, the 
anchoring of social rights in the law, or a broad notion of solidarity that 
ties people to a common ·fate, such systems wiH likely to continue down 
the path of desolidarity, unless those bearing the brunt of cost-shifting and 
economic adjustment can muster the political clout to seek .a negotiated 
solution that advances equity alongside austerity. 
· The outcomes may be more hopeful in universal, statutory systems. If, 
as seems likely, economic and demographic pressures continue to strain 
the finances and generosity of such welfare states, then governments and 
employers will be hard-pressed to seek solutions that redefine solidarit¥ and 
the content of social rights. But given the presence of powerful countervailing 
forces in such welfare states and reform politics, successful adjustment will 
hinge on forging a consensus with these stakeholders over a new conception 
of solidarity that continues to ensure broad provision, spreads the burden 
of adjustment fairly, and shelters the most vulnerable from harm. 
There is no reason to expect countries to converge on a common path of 
welfare state adjustment. There are several possible options.42 Each country's 
outcome will depend not only on past 'policy legacies' (Pierson 1993b; Weir 
and Skocpol 1985), but also on political choice and the particular settle-
ments that stakeholders are able to forge among themselves. 
42 Future choices in health care reforms- and how they are viewed- will depend o n the 
particular problems facing each type of health care system and the specific politics of reform 
in each country. For example, countries with universal health care provision might decide to 
adopt a defined benefits package that is mandatory, universal , and comprehensive, but that 
explicitly spells out the services that the national programme wiJJ cover. Individuals with 
the means to do so could then purchase extra benefits at an additional charge, but the most 
vulnerable would still have a right to fairly comprehensive coverage. Such a remedy, how-
ever, would officially sanction some differences in access based on ability to pay and may 
imply a stricter delineation of medical necessity. British and German citizens might view this 
solution either as a violation of solidarity, or as an attempt to redefine it to reconcile eq uity 
and cost containment goals. But if' the USA adopted a defined benefits package as part of 
national health insurance, it would clearly signal a reversal of desolidarity. See Brown ( 1998) 
for a discussion of different health care reform options that European countries are con-
templating or have recently adopted. See Advisory Council for Concerted Actjon in Health 
Care (1995, 1997) for a discussion of reform options for Germany. On redefining medical 
necessity to fit new policy goals, see Charles et al. (1997). 
